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DISSENTING MINORITY STOCKHOLDER'S RIGHT
OF APPRAISAL
WILLIAM F. LOONEY, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The law recognizes the existence of corporations as separate
legal entities composed of stockholders who have invested their funds
in common. The corporate charter is the contract which binds the
stockholders together.' In general, decisions made within the frame-
work of the corporate charter are made by the holders of a majority
of the stock.' Other decisions, more fundamental to the continued
existence of the corporation, often require the approval of the holders
of more than a mere majority of the stock. 3 Early cases held that
fundamental changes, such as liquidation, sale or exchange of all the
assets, or merger of the corporation with another, required the
approval of all the stockholders.'
This requirement of stockholder unanimity gave minority stock-
holders a veto power over fundamental stockholder decisions, and
created the possibility that a stubborn minority could thwart the
majority from taking action obviously desirable for the protection and
continued existence of the corporation. In corporations composed of
large numbers of stockholders having widely divergent interests, and
not intimately acquainted with the corporate affairs, securing the
support of all the stockholders could be an impossible task. For
this reason, virtually all American jurisdictions have provided that
at least some fundamental decisions may be made by less than all
the stockholders. In most jurisdictions, dissenting stockholders have
been given the right at least in certain cases, to withdraw their invest-
ment by demanding and receiving payment for their stock. Where
the corporation and the stockholder fail to agree on the value of the
stock, the value is determined by appraisal.
Although most appraisal statutes follow the same general pattern,
the differences are so significant that an examination of the specific
statute involved would be necessary before the rights and obligations
of a stockholder could be determined with certainty. The problems
* A.B. 1953, Harvard College; LL.B. 1958, Harvard Law School ; Asst. U.S. Attorney,
U.S. Dept. of Justice.
1 See Lattin, Minority and Dissenting Shareholders' Rights in Fundamental
Changes, 23 Law & Contemp. Prob. 307 (1958).
2 See 13 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations, Permanent
Edition, 1961, § 5715 et seq. (hereinafter referred to as Fletcher).
Id. at § 5797.
4 Ibid.; cf. Calman v. Guaranty Security Corp., 271 Mass. 533, 543; 171 N.E.
830, 834 (1930) ; Treadwell v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 73 Mass. (7 Gray) 393, 404 (1856).
5 See Note, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1132 (1959) ; Lattin, supra note 1.
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encountered in one state may be nonexistent in another and so, in an
effort to encompass the majority of problems incident to appraisal,
only the statutes in those states which have enacted the Uniform
Commercial Code shall be considered.° Ranging from the relatively
short Massachusetts statute' to the comprehensive treatment in New
York,8 they provide an excellent cross-section of this statutory body
and when compared with the Model Business Corporation Act,
provide good basis for examination and solution of the problems
connected with appraisal.
Apart from legislation, much has been written on the subject 9
and from a gleaning of this wealth of legal discussion, what an adequate
statute should contain seems certain. Clearly, the circumstances under
which dissenting stockholders are entitled to appraisal, the standards
to be applied by the appraisers in fixing the value of the stock, and
the procedures to be followed in the conduct of the appraisal, should
be plainly stated.
IL PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH APPRAISAL STATUTES
The most common problems connected with appraisal statutes
can be separated into two general categories. First, the substantive
6 Alaska: Ma. Bus. Corp. Act f§ 62, 73.
Arkansas: Ark.. Stat. Ann. § 64-703 (1957).
Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 33-374 (1958).
Georgia: Ga. Code Ann. §§ 22-1845 to -1850 (Supp. 1961).
Illinois: Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 32, §§ 157.70, 157.73 (1959).
Kentucky: Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 271.415(4), 271.490 (1955).
Massachusetts: Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 156, §§ 46, 46E (1959).
Michigan: Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 450.44 (1948), 450.54 (Supp. 1956).
New Hampshire: N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 294:42(vi), 294:76 to :80 (1955).
New Jersey: N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 14:3-5, 14:12-6 to -7 (Supp. 1961).
New Mexico: N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 51-2-31, 51-11-5 to -6, 51-11-9 (1953).
New York: N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 21.
Ohio: Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 1701.74, 1701.76(C), 1701.8I(B), 1701.83(B),
1701.85 (1955).
Oklahoma: Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, §§ 1.157 to .161, 1.172 (1951).
Oregon: Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 57.490, 57.516 (1961).
Pennsylvania: Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§ 2852-311,, 2852-515, 2852-810, 2852-908
(1958).
Rhode Island: R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §§ 7-5-8 to -16 (1958).
Wyoming: Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 17-36.71 to .72 (1957).
7 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., supra note 6.
N.Y. Stock Corp. Law, supra note 6.
9 See, Levy Rights of Dissenting Shareholders to Appraisal and Payment, 15
Cornell L.Q. 420 (1930) ; Lattin, Remedies of Dissenting Stockholders Under Appraisal
Statutes, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 233 (1931) ; Lattin, Equitable Limitations on Statutory or
Charter Powers Given to Majority Shareholders, 30 Mich. L. Rev. 645 (1932) ; Lattin,
Reappraisal of Appraisal Statutes, 38 Mich. L. Rev. 1165 (1940) ; Note, 60 Yale L.J.
337 (1951) ; Note 28 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1021 (1953) ; Note, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1528 (1953) ;
Kaplan, Problems in the Acquisition of Shares of Dissenting Minorities, 34 E.U.L.
Rev. 291 (1954) ; Lattin, supra note 1; Note, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 251 (1958) ; Note,
72 Harv. L. Rev. 1132 (1959) ; Bozenhard, The Massachusetts Appraisal Act and
Minority Stockholders, 45 Mass. L.Q. 27 (1960).
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right of the stockholder to be paid the value of his stock, and second,
the procedural steps by which the appraisal is conducted and payment
made.
A. SUBSTANTIVE RIGIITS OF THE STOCKHOLDER
Fundamental changes to which appraisal statutes apply; the
availability of alternate remedies; and the standards used in deter-
mining the "value" of the stock constitute the three major areas into
which dissenting stockholders' substantive rights can be divided.
1. Fundamental Changes to which Appraisal Statutes Apply.
The Massachusetts and New York statutes and the Model Act provide
that a dissenting stockholder has the right to demand and to receive
payment of the value of his stock where the requisite number of other
stockholders vote a fundamental change. However, in many jurisdic-
tions a dissenting stockholder has this right with respect to one form of
fundamental corporate change but not with respect to another. For
example, some jurisdictions provide for appraisal and payment if
the corporation merges, but not if the corporation sells or exchanges
substantially all of its assets. The Code states uniformly provide for
appraisal rights for dissenting minority stockholders in the case of
mergers or consolidations. But in the case of a sale or transfer of
substantially all the assets of the corporation, Arkansas and Georgia
are excepted, since no appraisal rights appear in their statutes.
Connecticut, although aligning itself with the majority of Code states,
is unique in that the statute provides for appraisal only where the
sale is for securities. 10 This legislative inadvertence in failing to
provide for appraisal and payment, except where the form of corporate
consolidation is that of a statutory merger, is far from trivial since it
provides an obvious loophole to avoid payment to the minority
altogether. Therefore, a well-drafted statute should reflect the fact
that the rights of the dissenting minority should not depend upon the
mere form of the consolidation.
In addition to providing for appraisal in the cases of mergers,
consolidations and sale of assets, some jurisdictions provide for
appraisal in the case of other forms of corporate action. For example,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Oklahoma provide a right of
appraisal upon a change of corporate purpose. Connecticut, New
York and Oklahoma authorize appraisal rights to any stockholder
whose priority or preferential stock rights have been adversely affected
whereas Ohio only offers this to preferred stockholders.'
The result of these varying provisions among the states and the
variety of circumstances which initiate appraisal rights is, at best, a
10 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann., supra note 6, at § 373(d).
11 For a brief list of the various provisions with respect to this point see 2 ABA-
ALI Model Bus. Corp, Act Ann., § 73, ¶ 2 (1960),
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very tenuous reconciliation of interests between the two shareholder
groups. To permit a majority of the stockholders of a corporation to
make fundamental changes for the good of the common investment and
by the same effort, protect the minority stockholders from complete
domination by the majority calls for a degree of legislative acumen found
wanting in many jurisdictions. The consequence is piece-meal legis-
lation which enables the majority to attain its objective with or
without appraisal depending solely on the form of action employed.' 2
2. Availability of Alternate Remedies. Whether appraisal and
payment is a dissenting stockholder's only remedy in the event of a
fundamental change in the corporation generally depends upon
whether or not he can prove fraud or deceit. A leading case on the
subject is Cole v. Wells," in which the owner of twenty-three percent
of the stock of American Optical Company brought a bill in equity
against the owners of the other seventy-seven percent of the stock and
the corporation. The defendant stockholders were also the officers of
the company and had full control of its management and operation. The
bill alleged that the defendant stockholders had improperly diverted to
their own use certain assets of the corporation under the guise of
salaries and that they had wrongfully caused the corporation to sell all
of its assets to themselves as trustees for less than adequate considera-
tion. The plaintiff argued that he had voted against the sale at a stock-
holders' meeting duly called for the purpose of considering the sale, and
that he thereafter demanded payment for his stock. He alleged that
during the course of negotiating the value of his stock with the
officers of the corporation, he had occasion to cause an audit of the
books and records, and at that time discovered the alleged wrong-
doing of the defendants. His amended prayers for relief sought an
accounting to the corporation by the defendant stockholders for the
assets wrongfully converted by them to their own use, together with
an accounting to the corporation for the full value of all the assets of
the corporation transferred to the defendants as trustees. From the
overruling of their demurrers, the defendants appealed. The Supreme
Judicial Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to maintain his bill.
The defendants had interposed a plea in bar that the corporation had
offered to submit the question of the value of the plaintiff's stock to
arbitration under Statute 1903, Chapter 437, Section 44, 14 including
the plaintiff's claims with respect to the misappropriation of corporate
12 For example, most jurisdictions permit dissenting minority stockholders of sur-
viving consolidating corporations to demand appraisal. However, it is quite uncommon
for minoHty stockholders of a corporation which has acquired substantially all the
assets of another to have such rights.
13 224 Mass. 504, 113 N.H. 189 (1916).
4 The predecessor of the present Massachusetts appraisal statute, supra note 6.
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funds, but that the plaintiff had refused to proceed with the arbi-
tration. As to this the court said:
It is plain that the defendants through their control of the
corporation cannot compel the plaintiff, who was ignorant
of their misdoings, to accept payment for his stock upon a
valuation of the assets which excludes the amounts mis-
appropriated. A demand under such circumstances cannot
be held to have the force and effect of the demand con-
templated by the statute, and there was no irrevocable
election, as the defendants contend, to receive payment upon
a valuation to be fixed by the agreement of parties, or by
arbitration, whereby all demands for an accounting or pro-
ceedings to set aside the transfer as violative of his just
rights as a dissenting or minority stockholder were waived."
This case appears to state the majority rule although a different
result is possible in Connecticut, Michigan and Pennsylvania. In
these states, the statute expressly provides that appraisal shall be a
stockholder's exclusive remedy which is the same position adopted in
New York and Ohio by judicial decision? However, it is submitted
that if a corporation by vote of a majority of its stockholders has
the right to make certain fundamental changes, it seems only logical
that dissenting minority stockholders should not have the power,
absent fraud or illegality, to enjoin or set aside the proposed change.
On the other hand, where fraud or illegality exists, the minority stock-
holder should have his usual equitable remedies and not be forced
to choose between acceding to the change or seeking appraisal and
payment. The most sensible rule is the one most often applied. That
is, appraisal and payment is a dissenting stockholder's only remedy
unless he can show fraud or illegality in which case he can seek
equitable relief.
3. Definitions of "Value." The Massachusetts statute states
that the appraisers are to ascertain the "value" of the stock as of the
date of the fundamental change. Statutes of other states employ
phrases such as "fair value," "market value" and "fair cash value.'" 7
15 Supra note 13 at 513-14, 113 N.E. at 191.
16 New York ; Anderson v. International Mineral & Chemical Corp., 295 N.Y.
343, 67 N.E.2d 573 (1946). Ohio ; Geiger v. American Seeding Mach. Co., 124 Ohio
St. 222, 177 N.E. 594 (1931).
17 Of the states which have enacted the Uniform Commercial Code, seven states
call for payment of "fair value" (Alaska, Illinois, New 'Hampshire, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania and Wyoming) ; four states call for payment of "fair cash value"
(Arkansas, Georgia, Michigan and Ohio) ; two for payment of "value" (Massachu-
setts and New York) ; two for "full market value" (New Jersey and New Mexico) ;
one for "fair market value" (Kentucky) and one for "full and fair value" (Rhode
Island). Ohio has defined "fair cash value" and Oklahoma has defined "fair value" as
used in their appraisal statutes to mean fair market value. Arkansas has used the term
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As a practical matter, the biggest single distinction between these
definitions probably turns on whether it is open to the stockholder
to prove that the value of his stock is, for one reason or another, of
greater value than market. If there is a market for the stock of the
company, the stockholder, if entitled to market value or fair cash
value, is probably restricted to the market price of the stock. If
entitled to fair value, he can probably prove that the market price
of the stock did not represent its fair value.
Restricting the stockholder to market value would seem to have
the advantage of easy determination providing there was a sufficiently
active market for the stock. However, most appraisal statutes ex-
pressly provide that the value of the stock, however defined, should
not include any change in value or market price caused by the pro-
posed corporate change. Thus, even determining the market value of
the stock can become complicated if there were fluctuations in the
price of the stock at or near the valuation date.
As defined by the Massachusetts court in the Cole case:
`the value of the stock' means not merely market price if
the stock is traded in by the public, but the intrinsic value,
to determine which all the assets and liabilities must be
ascertained.18
In the case of Martignette v. Sagamore Mfg. Co." the court later
modified and to some extent amplified its definition stating:
The statement of the rule for appraising stock on merger in
terms of 'intrinsic value' affirms that in all merger cases
market price is not the only measure, so that, as a matter
of course, other evidence will be relevant ... .
The rule does not mean that prices, in an established
market in normal times, of a widely held stock bought for
investment by well-informed persons will not be entitled to
`considerable weight' . . . . The rule does mean that even if
such a market is shown other evidence is relevant and that
it is for the appraisers in the particular case to determine
the weight of the relevant factors.'
However, in situations where there has been no substantial market
for the corporation's stock, there is probably little difference in the
proof of value under any of the common definitions. Proof of the
price a willing buyer would pay and a willing seller would accept,
"value" interchangeably with "fair cash value" in its appraisal statute, and Connecticut
has used the terms "value" and "fair value" interchangeably.
18 Cole v. Wells, supra note 13, at 513, 113 N.E. at 191.
19 340 Mass. 136, 163 N.E.2d 9 (1959).
20 Id. at 141-42, 163 N.E.2d at 12-13.
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would undoubtedly be substantially the same as proof of value or
fair value of the stock.
B. PROCEDURE FOR APPRAISAL AND PAYMENT
The procedure for appraisal and payment can be divided into
six steps: (1) preliminary procedural requirements to qualify for
appraisal and payment, (2) preliminary negotiations between the
parties, (3) consolidation of claims, (4) conduct of the appraisal,
(5) allocation of costs and (6) payment of interest on the award. A
well-drafted statute should spell out each of these steps. The New
York statute and the Model Act do so and in Massachusetts the
steps are covered either by statute or judicial decision. Unfortunately,
most appraisal statutes are generally less inclusive.
I. Preliminary Procedural Requirements to Qualify for Appraisal
and Payment. The general pattern of appraisal statutes require the
dissenting stockholder to make written objection to the proposed
corporate change, to refrain from voting for the proposed action, and
thereafter to demand payment for his stock. There is usually a short
time limit within which the dissenting stockholder must object and
demand payment, and failure to act within the time limit operates
as a waiver of the stockholder's right to appraisal and payment.
Massachusetts requires the dissenting stockholder to affirm-
atively vote in opposition to the proposed change." Otherwise he is
not entitled to payment. This places the burden on the stockholder
to see to it that his stock is, in fact, voted at the meeting. If the
stockholder resides a considerable distance from the Commonwealth,
he may have to appoint an attorney to vote the stock for him. If his
stock is held by and in the name of a nominee, he will have to make
certain that the nominee receives and carries out his instructions with
regard to the voting of the stock. If the stockholder's stock is not
voted in opposition to the proposed consolidation or sale despite his
instructions, the stockholder may have a cause of action against his
attorney or nominee, but he has clearly lost the right to an appraisal
and payment.
Section 74 of the Model Business Corporation Act provides that
stockholders, in order to qualify for appraisal, must first register
their written objection at or prior to the stockholders' meeting, and
then make written demand for payment within ten days thereafter.
Both the requirements of the Massachusetts statute and those of the
Model Act are unnecessarily cumbersome. The imposition of the
two-step requirement on dissenting stockholders is a trap for the
unwary without providing any particularly advantageous information
21 Arkansas, Georgia, Michigan and New Hampshire are among the states with a
like requirement that the stockholder vote in opposition to the proposed change.
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to the corporation. Perhaps the most expeditious and sensible re-
quirement is the one provided by the New York statute. There, the
stockholder, within twenty days after notice of the - stockholders' meet-
ing, or prior to the vote, whichever is later, must file with the cor-
poration written objection to the proposed plan and demand payment
for his stock. This eliminates the two-step requirement of the Massa-
chusetts statute and the Model Act while providing the corporation
with the necessary information as to the number of dissenting shares.
The Massachusetts statute does not state clearly whether a
stockholder must vote all of his stock against the proposal, or whether
he can vote part of his stock in favor of the proposal and part of the
stock against, and retain a right of appraisal as to the latter. This
can be a serious problem for one in whose name the stock of various
other beneficial owners may be registered. In New Jersey under a
similar appraisal statute, the court discussed this very question. In
Bache & Co. v. General Instrument Corp.,' the plaintiff-brokerage
house voted stock standing in its name for and against a merger and
the court concluded that plaintiff waived no appraisal rights, thus
protecting the plaintiff's customers, the beneficial owners of the stock.
However, in view of the courts dictum:
We must not blind ourselves to the realities of present-clay
security practices, or the complex mechanisms of the stock
market. A brokerage house like plaintiff almost always holds
blocks of stock in its 'street name' for various beneficial
owners. If defendant is correct in its position, it would
logically follow that unless all of plaintiff's customers voted
the same way, those voting against the merger—if they
owned only a minority of the shares held by plaintiff—would
have any appraisal rights normally theirs completely wiped
out.23
it would appear that the case is restricted to its facts. Therefore,
whether or not a trustee or individual shareholder could argue on
the basis of the Bache case remains an open question. In any event,
a well-drafted statute should provide that a stockholder who is a
nominee should retain a right of appraisal as to the portion of stock
standing in his name, which is a proviso in the Model Act.
2. Preliminary Negotiations between the Parties. Every ap-
praisal statute at least provides for the possibility that the dissenting
shareholder and the corporation might agree on the value of the
stock, although the statutes vary in the extent to which preliminary
22 74 N.J. Super. 92, ISO A.2d 535 (1962). The question before the court was
whether the term "stockholder" in the appraisal statute referred to "registered owner"
or "beneficial owner." For a discussion of this aspect of the case, see case notes, infra.
23 Id. at 101, 180 A.2d 540.
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negotiations must be conducted. The Massachusetts statute provides
no express procedure for negotiation, but seems to assume that some
form of negotiation will take place. Both the New York statute and
the Model Act require the corporation to make a written offer to
purchase the stock of dissenting shareholders at a price deemed by
the corporation to be the value of the stock, and to furnish the stock-
holder with a recent balance sheet and profit and loss statement.
This at least gets the negotiations underway, and provides the stock-
holder with some basis upon which to value his stock. If agreement
is not reached as to the value of the stock within a relatively short
time, either party can petition for judicial intervention. In this
instance, the court has wide discretion to either value the stock or
appoint an appraiser.
With the exception of Massachusetts and New Hampshire, all
of the Code states have sanctioned some form of judicial proceeding
to value the stock when the parties are unable to agree." Generally,
the court is given authority to appoint one or more appraisers vested
with powers similar to those exercised by masters in equity. In
Massachusetts, each party appoints an appraiser and they appoint a
third." The statute has no express provision for judicial supervision,
and whether or not the court could appoint a third appraiser in the
event of disagreement is a question that has never presented itself.
It would seem that judicial intervention is at least a possibility in
Massachusetts. '
3. Consolidation of Claims. One of the distinct advantages in
providing for judicial supervision of the appraisal is the consolidation
of the claims of different stockholders into a single proceeding. In
seven Code states" this is expressly provided for by the appraisal
statutes. In others, consolidation is possible whether or not the
statute so provides.
The conflict occurs in states like Georgia, Massachusetts and
New Hampshire where the choice of appraisers is left to the parties,
because conceivably, each stockholder could desire a different ap-
praiser. The result would be a series of different appraisals which
would consume time, duplicate effort, increase the over-all cost, and
24 Alaska, Arkansas, Michigan, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Wyoming
provide for the appointment of three appraisers' by the court. Kentucky, New York
and Rhode Island provide for the appointment of one appraiser. Illinois, New Jersey,
Oklahoma and Oregon provide that the stock shall be valued by the court. In Con-
necticut a court can appoint one or more appraisers. The Georgia statute provides that
each party is to appoint an appraiser and the appraisers in the event of disagreement
shall appoint an umpire. If the appraisers cannot agree on an umpire, the court may
appoint. Massachusetts and New Hampshire have no provision for court appointment
of appraisers.
26 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann, ch. 156, § 46 (1959).
26 Connecticut, Kentucky, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island and
Wyoming expressly provide for consolidation.
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undoubtedly result in different stock values. However, the statutes
of these states are not without merit. The valuation of the stock of
a corporation might easily require knowledge of accounting, eco-
nomics, market conditions and the industry itself. Permitting the
parties to choose their appraisers gives them an opportunity to choose
someone in whom they have confidence and who possesses the requi-
site knowledge.
It is submitted, to resolve this conflict, the legislature. could re-
quire the corporation to hold a meeting of all dissenting shareholders
within a specified time after a petition for an appraisal has been
filed. The dissenting stockholders, by majority vote, could then ap-
point an appraiser to represent them who along with the court and
company appointed appraisers, would determine the value of the
stock. Although this is a more cumbersome method of appointing
appraisers than leaving the choice up to the court, it has the ad-
vantage of giving all the dissenting stockholders an opportunity to
participate in the choice. A small stockholder residing far from the
state of incorporation who is not represented by counsel would have
had at least some voice in the proceedings.
4. Conduct of the Appraisal. The degree or court supervision
of the conduct of the appraisal varies greatly from state to state. In
some cases the appraisal itself is conducted by the court. In others,
it is conducted by appraisers appointed by the court. 27 In such cases
the conduct of the appraisal can be controlled by the court, pre-
sumably in accordance with the normal rules of procedure. Evidence
relevant to the determination of the value of the stock as defined by
the applicable statute would then be admissible in evidence. Massa-
chusetts and New Hampshire have no statutory provision whereas
the Model Business Corporation Act gives the court the authority to
establish procedure for the conduct of the appraisal." This has the
advantage of giving the parties the opportunity to be heard on pre-
liminary matters in advance of the appraisal (e.g., whether or not a
stenographic record shall be kept).
5. Costs. Although considered to be one of the most important
considerations in the appl4isal procedure," and certainly one of the
most practical, the Massachusetts statute makes no provision for
allocation of cost. However, there is some authority to the effect that
a court has jurisdiction to allocate costs under general equity prin-
27 Supra note 21.
28 New York spells out broad powers in the appraiser to hear evidence with
respect to valuation of the stock. N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 21.4.
22 Levy, Rights of Dissenting Shareholders to Appraisal and Payment, 15 Cornell
L.Q. 420, 439 (1930) ; Note, 60 Yale L.J. 237 (1951).
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ciples," and statutes in some jurisdictions' expressly grant such dis-
cretion but it is doubtful whether the Massachusetts court would so
hold. Clearly, an adequate appraisal statute should include a pro-
vision for allocating costs, especially if a consolidated proceeding is
to be held. The Model Business Corporation Act provides that costs
shall be borne by the corporation unless the court finds that the stock-
holders acted vexatiously or in bad faith in demanding the appraisa1. 32
The difficulty with this approach is that an allocation based on a
finding of the stockholders' motives would be difficult at best, and is
apt to turn on the extent to which the appraisers' findings agree with
the stockholders' contentions. If the stockholders are given the right
to an appraisal, there is little reason for inquiring into their motives
in asserting their rights.
It could be argued that the costs should be borne by the cor-
poration, or, in effect, by the majority stockholders, since the ap-
praisal was made necessary because they chose to vary the terms of
the contract between themselves and the dissenting stockholders.
However, this gives dissenting stockholders an opportunity to engage
in an appraisal proceeding at no cost to themselves. Furthermore, the
right of the majority stockholders to make fundamental changes was
a part of the contract between the stockholders. It is suggested' that
costs be subject, in the first instance, to court scrutiny for fairness.
Thereafter, they should be allocated equally among all the dissenting
stockholders in the proportion that their holdings bear to the total
stock issued and outstanding on the date of the vote, the remainder
to be paid by the corporation. This would have the advantage of re-
lieving the court from an inquiry into the motives of the parties. At
the same time, each party would tend to avoid unwarranted expense
because of the detrimental effect on his own proportionate financial
interest.
In addition to the problem of cost allocation, there is also the
problem of determining what fees and expenses are to be included in
costs. It is suggested that costs should include not only the fees of
the appraisers, but also those of expert witnesses. If costs were
limited solely to fees and expenses of appraisers, dissenting stock-
holders' might well find that their witness fees exceeded the value of
their interest in the corporation. However, fees of appraisers and
expert witnesses should be subject to court approval for fairness.
6. Interest. The question of payment of interest depends to
30 See Note, 60 Yale L.J. 237 (1951) ; Ashton v. Pittsburgh Consol. Coal Co., 69
Pa. D. & C. 277 (C. P. Allegheny Co. 1949).
31 E.g., Kentucky and Ohio.
32 Such provisions are found as well in Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania and
Wyoming.
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some extent on the stockholder's status between the time he demands
payment for his stock and when he is actually paid. If after demand
his corporate rights are limited to appraisal and payment, it would
seem that he is entitled to payment of interest. In Massachusetts a
dissenting stockholder is not entitled to interest until thirty days after
the appraisers' finding,' but since the Massachusetts Supreme Ju-
dicial Court has held that a dissenting stockholder retains his interest
in the corporation until he has surrendered his stock and has been
paid," the thirty day suspension of interest appears justified.
With respect to the other Code states, inconsistency is more the
rule than the exception. No particular correlation can be found
between those states which allow interest on the award' and those
which cut off the stockholder's interest in the corporation immediately
upon demand for payment." Of the seven states which have this
"cut off" rule, only Connecticut, New York and Ohio expressly pro-
vide for payment of interest.
As a practical matter, the dissenting stockholder's status as a
stockholder during this period may be largely illusory. He is entitled
to dividends paid by his corporation, but if he is a stockholder in a
corporation which has sold its assets to another corporation in ex-
change for its stock, he is a stockholder in a corporate shell, and
obviously no dividends will be paid. In the meantime, the corpora-
tion has his money.
Once the stockholder has made demand for payment for his
stock, at least in the absence of fraud, he has probably irrevocably
committed himself to that remedy and cannot thereafter change his
mind, at least without the consent of the corporation." It is sug-
gested therefore, that the stockholder be paid interest from the date
on which he demands payment, and after he has demanded payment
his right to further participation in the corporation be terminated.
This would reflect the fact that once he has made demand for pay-
ment, his status is more that of a creditor than that of a stockholder.
This approach could be taken without necessarily precluding the
33 Martignette v. Sagamore Mfg. Co., supra note 19,
34 Ibid. Alaska, Illinois and Oregon, like Massachusetts, provide that a stock-
holder's interest in the corporation ceases upon payment to him of the value of his
stock.
35 Alaska, Connecticut, Illinois, New York, Ohio, Oregon and Wyoming expressly
provide for the payment of interest.
36 Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Michigan, New York and Ohio provide that a
stockholder's interest in the corporation, except for a right to appraisal and payment,
ceases upon demand for payment. A stockholder's interest in Kentucky ceases when
he commences an action in court for valuation of his stock.
37 Connecticut, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania and New York provide that a
stockholder may withdraw his demand for, payment only with the consent of the
board of directors or of the corporation. Rhode Island is the only Uniform Com-
mercial Code state expressly providing that the stockholder may withdraw his demand
at any time prior to the appraisers' report.
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stockholder from asserting a cause of action arising prior to the time
he made demand for payment.
CONCLUSION
As can be seen from this brief survey, the right of dissenting
minority stockholders to receive payment for their stock and the
procedures to be followed in demanding and conducting an appraisal
of their stock vary widely from state to state. No doubt few stock-
holders who invest in a corporation have any idea of their rights and
obligations in this regard, yet should the majority decide on some
fundamental change in the corporation, appraisal rights and proce-
dures become of great importance not only to the dissenting minority,
but to the majority stockholders and the corporation as well. It is
just as important to the corporation that the dissenting minority be
paid as quickly and expeditiously as possible as it is to the minority
stockholders themselves. Any procedure which is inadequate works a
hardship on all parties concerned."
To be adequate, an appraisal statute should be both clear and
complete. That is, the statute should be clear enough that a minority
stockholder can understand what procedure he is to follow in de-
manding appraisal, and complete enough to discount the problems
which can be expected to arise during the appraisal procedure. Com-
pleteness also calls for specificity in enumerating just what funda-
mental changes in the corporation shall give rise to appraisal rights
and what stockholders are to have this right. It should provide the
minority stockholder with a simple method of making demand and
for preliminary settlement negotiations.
If appraisal becomes necessary, there should be provision for
consolidating all claims into a single hearing, as well as for payment
of interest and costs. Unless an appraisal statute covers each of these
points, it cannot be considered adequate. It is not necessary that
appraisal rights and procedures be uniform throughout the states,
but it is important that each state have a simple, comprehensive
procedure. It has been this legislative failure to clearly define the
methods for appraisal and payment which has resulted in the delays,
uncertainties and legal expense incident to the appraisal process.
In view of this, and because the problem is, in the main, proce-
dural, any remedy would seem to lie with the legislature. Statutory
enactment would expedite clarification and by the same process,
eliminate the substantive inconsistencies which have resulted from
judicial decisions and piece-meal legislation.
88 See Kaplan, Problems in the Acquisition of Shares of Dissenting Minorities,
34 B.U.L. Rev. 291 (1954).
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